What is the meaning of ‘specially authorised officers’ under the Renters’ Rights Act, and what actions do local housing authorities have to take to ensure officers are correctly authorised?

The power of entry under section 126 of the Renters’ Rights Act 2025 (RRA25) has reawakened issues similar to those posed by section 239 of the Housing Act 2004 (HA04), which have never been conclusively resolved. 

Do local housing authorities (LHAs) have to take specific action to ensure officers are correctly authorised to inspect residential premises using RRA25 powers?

One simple (but still important) point to make is around who can be an officer of an LHA, as this term is used in RRA25. It was sometimes argued that officers had to be local authority employees, but that has not been tenable since Pinfold North Ltd v Humberside Fire Authority [2010] EWHC 2944 (QB) [2011] ICR 760. In that case, it was held that even a statutory chief officer need not be such an employee: contractors can be given that status. These days, many local authorities share regulatory services, using employees formally employed by one of the authorities involved. Provided their jobs include appointment as an officer of one of the local authorities, this should pose no difficulties in their exercising any relevant powers where this term is mentioned.

As under HA04, the authorisations must be signed off by a senior officer who comes within the definition of ‘chief officer’ or ‘deputy chief officer’ as originally contained in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (see section 126(10) RRA25). While titles are many and varied these days, essentially this means someone who directly reports to the head of paid service/chief executive (excluding support staff) or someone who reports to such a chief officer – and whose role includes the relevant functions. Typically, this means assistant directors or people at the equivalent level. A head of service who reported to an assistant director, rather than someone at director level, would not come within this definition.

Notably, the authorisation must state the particular purpose for which the officer is authorised. There was a lot of discussion previously, with the taking of legal advice, as to whether this meant that such a senior officer had to authorise the use of the entry powers each time. Understandably, there were concerns about the administrative burdens this would place on LHAs, as well as slowing down response times. A LACORS note highlighted the discussion with the relevant government department and proposed a general form of wording that could be used which they considered would work. However, the same note also referred to some First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decisions in which appeals were upheld due to questions about the authorisations and notices of entry. And that is the key issue – if the relevant officer is not duly authorised, will any subsequent action be flawed and unenforceable? As FTT decisions, these did not, of course, set any precedent.

I have searched two legal databases and the tribunal records for more recent decisions that might help, but without success.

For me, the main additional question flows from the insertion of the word ‘specially’ before ‘authorised officer’ at various places in section 126. The arguments will hang on whether this means that the individual must be specifically authorised by a relevant senior officer to carry out the particular purposes of this section generally or for each individual property. My view – and it can be no more than that at this stage – is that the only safe approach is for a fresh authorisation to be issued each time. Anything else risks a case collapsing at a later stage. To paraphrase those immortal lines from the first Dirty Harry film – how lucky do you feel?

So yes, LHAs will need to set up the procedures to authorise individual officers to use the powers of entry under section 126 RRA25 for the relevant purpose each time – unless they want to take the risks outlined above.

If – or when – this point is tested before the courts or tribunals, the normal rules of statutory interpretation will apply. Usually, what Parliament intended, or what ministers may have said during the passage of the bill, will be irrelevant. The exception is where there is sufficient ambiguity to trigger the rule in Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 3 [1993] AC 593. 

There may also be arguments under the Human Rights Act 1998, which applies the European Convention of Human Rights to domestic courts. Article 8 (right to privacy and family life) and Article 1 to the First Protocol (peaceful use of possessions) are likely to be engaged whenever a statutory power of entry is used by a public authority. This underlines the need to be able to justify why entry is sought in the individual case, and the lawfulness of doing so. 

Take a look on RIAMS Libraries for procedures and guidance on authorisation of officers (MP27) and delegated authority (MP11).